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Pritchard and Thompson:

Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Genesis of Corporate Liability under Rule 10b‐5
A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson*
Draft 14 March 2018
Scholars have long recognized the seminal role played by SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur1 in
transforming insider trading law.2 Less recognized is the opinion’s foundational role in Rule 10b‐
5’s use to create a remedy against corporations for misstatements made by their officers (or
others) even if the speaker had no evil motive. That less‐discussed part of the case is our topic
here, for it was an important early step in the growth of two key securities issues that took root
during the 1960s—the judicial implication of private rights of action under Rule 10b‐5 and the
expansion of obligations of corporate directors under “federal corporation law.”3 Today, the
issue of corporate liability lies at the heart of the ongoing debate over the social purpose and
utility of securities fraud class actions. This Essay takes that question back to its historical roots
in the 1960s as the use of Rule 10b‐5 was accelerating, focusing on the debate in Texas Gulf
Sulphur among the judges of the Second Circuit, the “Mother Court” for securities law.4
Like its holding on insider trading, the Second Circuit’s holding on corporate liability was
deciding an issue that the Supreme Court had not yet come close to tackling. Each of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur holdings, however, drew on the foundation provided by the expansive statutory

*

Frances & George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Peter P. Weidenbruch
Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University, respectively. Pritchard acknowledges the generous
financial support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan.
1
401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968) (in banc).
2
We have tackled that subject from a historical perspective in related work that focuses on how
insider trading regulation shifted during the 1960s from a mechanistic approach under §16(b) to a broad
antifraud based remedy under Rule 10b‐5. Securities Law in the Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second
Circuit, and the Triumph of Purpose over Text, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. ‐‐ (forthcoming, 2018), available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119969.
3
See id. (developing the insider trading, private rights of action and federal corporation law as
the three pillars of securities law that arose during the 60s).
4
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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interpretation used by the Supreme Court in two securities cases decided earlier in the decade,
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and J.I. Case v. Borak.5 Capital Gains had endorsed a mode
of statutory interpretation that focused on implementing the purpose underlying the securities
laws, while J.I Case blessed the creation of novel causes of action by the judiciary to implement
those purposes. The Second Circuit tackled the task of defining the elements of these newfound
federal causes of action against the background of the common law. That embroiled the judges
of the Second Circuit in a broader jurisprudential debate on the relative weight that should be
afforded to text and purpose in statutory interpretation.
The question of the corporation’s liability for private damages loomed large for the
Second Circuit judges in Texas Gulf Sulphur, even though that question was not directly at issue
in an SEC action for injunctive relief. But the judges recognized that the private damages issue
under Rule 10b‐5 was the 800 pound gorilla; a majority of the court’s nine judges were inclined
to find a way to limit the corporation’s liability in the absence of wrongful intent. Two paths
toward the goal of limiting corporate liability presented themselves. The first was based on the
text of Rule 10b‐56 and the statutory provision that authorizes it, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.7
The textual possibility was for the court to construe narrowly “in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,” a requirement of both the rule and the statute. The alternative doctrinal
direction that the Second Circuit could have pursued to narrow Texas Gulf Sulphur’s potential
liability borrowed from the common law of fraud: What was the requisite state of mind for the
corporation making the misstatement?

5

375 U.S. 180 (1963); 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
17 CFR 240.10b‐5.
7
15 U.S.C § 78j(b).
6
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In the end, the Second Circuit majority in Texas Gulf Sulphur gave an expansive
interpretation to each of these requirements, a surprising result given the tone of their
discussions and the concerns raised about private causes of action. The simple explanation was
the court’s prudential retreat to address only the SEC’s pursuit of an injunction. That resolution
left for another day the looming issues arising from private actions for damages.
The court’s holdings on both “in connection with” and state of mind shaped subsequent
Supreme Court developments, but in divergent ways. The “in connection with” requirement,
which got to the Supreme Court fairly quickly, produced a consistent, and indeed, even more
expansive holding. In the following decade, however, the Court, with new personnel more
committed to text than purpose, would reject negligence in favor of a more restrictive standard
for state of mind.
We focus here on the role that text and purpose played in Texas Gulf Sulphur in
delineating limits for corporate liability under Rule 10b‐5 of the Exchange Act. We shed light on
that debate over corporate liability by analyzing not only material available in the published
opinions, but also the internal memos that the judges circulated among themselves prior to
issuing the decision.8 In Part I, we take a deep dive into the deliberations among the Second
Circuit judges on the question of corporate liability for material misstatements in Texas Gulf
Sulphur. In Part II, we look at that decision’s long‐term implications for securities law, followed
by a brief conclusion.

8

We obtained copies of the memos from the Henry Friendly Collection at the Harvard Law
School Library, hereinafter Friendly Collection.
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I. Corporate Liability for Material Misstatements and Possible Limits
The SEC complaint in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation presented two central claims. The
first was against various individuals who had purchased company stock while having confidential
inside information regarding an exceptionally rich ore find by the company. The second count
against the corporation alleged misleading statements in company press releases issued to
dampen rumors of that potentially enormous mineral find. The statements, viewed with the
benefit of hindsight, understated the find in material ways. Even so, the press release did not
seem motivated by a malevolent purpose. As Judge Henry Friendly put it in his concurring
opinion
No one has asserted, or reasonably could assert, that the purpose for issuing a
release was anything but good. TGS felt it had a responsibility to protect would‐
be buyers of its shares from what it regarded as exaggerated rumors first in the
Canadian and then in the New York City press, and none of the individual
defendants sought to profit from the decline in the price of TGS stock caused by
the release.9
The press release showed poor judgment, not ill intent.
Although this case involved the SEC as a plaintiff seeking an injunction, Friendly was
worried from the beginning about the difficulty of distinguishing government from private
claims.10 He was wary of creating a potentially enormous new source of liability for
corporations, a liability that would ultimately be borne by shareholders. After the case was
submitted to the in banc panel, Friendly had written Harvard securities law professor Louis Loss,
who he knew from the initial meetings leading to the American Law Institute’s project to draft a
comprehensive Federal Securities Code on which Friendly served as an adviser. The judge

9

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 866.
The district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur had noted that 49 private actions under Rule 10b‐5
were pending. See 258 F. Supp., 262, 267, n.1. A private suit based on the same facts eventually reached
the Tenth Circuit. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
10
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requested the relevant pages from Loss’s forthcoming revision of his treatise “dealing with the
remedial aspects of Rule 10b‐5 as applied to private litigation, since I do not think we could deal
intelligently with the instant case without considering its effect in that field.”11 Friendly had
already circulated a memo to his colleagues declaring that the corporation’s liability for its press
release was
the most important issue in the case. If there were any way to limit the holding
to injunctive relief or even to actions brought by the SEC, the dangers inherent
in the opinion of the panel majority would be anything like so great … the
financial consequences of holding corporation liable for innocent errors or
omissions in press releases, all judged on a basis of hindsight, are incalculable.
We kid ourselves when we talk of liability of ‘the corporation’; the rule
announced by the majority would cause thousands of innocent investors like
ourselves, who buy stocks and put them away, to be mulcted for the benefit of
tapewatchers and more particularly, of Pomerantz & Co.12
The question of insider trading on the potential mineral find was the headline grabber,
but Friendly recognized the substantially greater economic significance of the corporate
liability issue.
The memos among the judges reveal that most of Friendly’s colleagues shared his
concern about corporations’ liability for damages. As we discuss below, Kaufman and Anderson
responded with sympathetic memos and joined in Friendly’s concurrence in the published
decision making this point. Feinberg’s memo expressed similar worry, although he did not end
up joining in Friendly’s concurrence. The two dissenters to the decision, Moore and Lumbard,
favored narrowing the corporation’s liability.13

11

Letter from Henry J. Friendly to Louis Loss (5/27/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
12
Memo of HJF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/8/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library. Pomerantz is the name of a leading plaintiff’s side firm of the era,
one that is still active today. See http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/firm‐history‐1/.
13
Friendly in a memo to his judicial colleagues on the Gerstle case characterized his concurring
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur on this point was one that “commanded a majority of the court that
something more than mere negligence was needed to create liability for money damages.” Memo of HJF,
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As the debate unfolded in response to Friendly’s memo, the judges considered two
ways to rein in the possibility of large corporate damages for misstatements: 1) reading the “in
connection with a purchase of sale” requirement narrowly, when the alleged wrongdoer had
neither purchased nor sold; or 2) requiring scienter on the part of the corporation, the mental
state required for an actor to held liable for damages for fraud. In the end, the judges in the
majority limited their holding to injunction claims brought by the SEC, which was, after all, the
issue before them. In that context, the majority provided an expansive reading of Rule 10b‐5
which rested on its understanding of the purpose of the Exchange Act.

A. In Connection With
How broadly does the phrase “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”
sweep? It surely encompasses individuals and entities who make material misrepresentations
while buying or selling securities. Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, was doing neither at the time it
issued its ill‐advised press release. If the company had been buying back shares at the time of its
pessimistic press release (or more commonly, selling shares while making unduly optimistic
statements), liability would have been straightforward, even under the common law of deceit.
Indeed, a CEO purchasing shares while badmouthing the company’s prospects was the impetus
for the SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b‐5 back in 1942.14 But should liability extend to a corporation
that was neither buying nor selling its own securities? The text offers little guidance, although
the choice of “in connection with” rather than “in” suggests that Congress intended something
broader than just privity. How close does the requisite “connection” to a securities transaction
need to be?

Gerstle v. Gamble‐Skogmo, at 4 (2/20/73), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 65, Folder 1, Harvard Law School
Library.
14
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)
(comment by Milton Freeman, Attorney and Assistant Solicitor, SEC, 1934–46).
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The district court had concluded that the corporation’s benign intentions—and the fact
that it was not trading in its own securities—defeated the element that its misrepresentations
be “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” The lower court had held that “the
issuance of a false and misleading press release may constitute a violation of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b‐5 if its purpose is to affect the market price of the company’s stock to the advantage of
the company or its insiders.”15 The district court’s standard is reminiscent of the situation that
gave rise to Rule 10b‐5’s adoption; the only twist in the standard is extending liability to the
corporation as well as the officer who was manipulating the share price for his own benefit. But
both circumstances were absent on the facts presented in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
The Second Circuit majority rejected the narrow construction of “in connection with”
adopted by the district court, instead adopting a “reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public” standard.16 The majority’s rationale? “[T]he court below used a standard that
does not reflect the congressional purpose that prompted the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.”17 Purpose, not text, was the relevant standard, according to the
majority, rolling out a quote from Judge Learned Hand in support of that position:
the purpose of a statutory provision is the best test of the meanings of the
words chosen. We are to put ourselves so far as we can in the position of the
legislature that uttered them, and decide whether or not it declare that the
situation that has arisen is within what it wishes to cover. Indeed, at time the
purpose may be so manifest as to override even the explicit words used.18

15

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.Supp. 262, 293 (SDNY 1966) (citing Freed v. Szabo Food
Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEC.L . REP. P91317 (N.D.Ill. 1964)).
16
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 862 (“we hold that Rule 10b‐5 is violated whenever assertions
are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of
the financial media, if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead
irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior
purposes.”) (citation omitted).
17
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 858.
18
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 861 (quoting Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2 Cir.
1959) (L. Hand, J.).
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The purposes of the Exchange Act, according to the majority “were to promote public securities
markets and to protect the investing public from suffering inequities in trading, including,
specifically, inequities that follow from trading that has been stimulated by the publication of
false or misleading corporate information releases.”19 This finding of Congress’s purpose was
supported by legislative history proclaiming the virtues of corporate transparency.20
The majority took the additional step of citing other provisions of the securities laws
with narrower prerequisites as “demonstrat[ing] that when Congress intended that there be a
participation in a securities transaction as a prerequisite of a violation, it knew how to make that
intention clear.”21 (Of course, those provisions explicitly created private causes of action, in
contrast to the judicially discovered cause of action under § 10(b).) In the absence of clear
language limiting the scope of § 10(b), the majority was willing to read the “in connection with”
requirement as broadly as its reading of legislative purpose. The “obvious purposes of the Act to
protect the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets would be
seriously undermined” by a requirement that the defendants “engage[] in related securities
transactions or otherwise act[] with wrongful motives.”22 Stated at that level of abstraction,
statutory purpose could invoked to support virtually any measure against fraud. There was no
limiting principle.
The court majority did offer an evidentiary justification for its broad construction:
“Absent a securities transaction by an insider it is almost impossible to prove that a wrongful

19

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 858.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 858‐859 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 11
(1934) and S.Rep. N. 792, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
21
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860 (citing §§ 12[a](2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §77l(2) and §777q(a) and § 15 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)).
22
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.
20
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purpose motivated the issuance of the misleading statement.”23 Adding a requirement of
wrongful purpose to the “in connection with” requirement would make the anti‐fraud
prohibition underinclusive, in the majority’s view. The absence of a securities transaction “does
not negate the possibility of a wrongful purpose; perhaps the market did not react to the
misleading statement as much as was anticipated or perhaps the wrongful purpose was
something other than the desire to buy at a low price or sell at a high price.”24 The first
possibility seems somewhat fanciful—an attempt at fraud that fell short of the mark? The latter
suggestion is at least speculative. More candidly, the court argued “that the investing public may
be injured as much by one’s misleading statement containing inaccuracies caused by negligence
as by a misleading statement published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose.”25 Once
again, the majority fell back on what it viewed as the purpose of the statute—the protection of
investors. The statutory text was, at most, a secondary consideration.
The majority’s broad conclusion with respect to the “in connection with” argument got
little pushback from the judges on the Second Circuit who had concerns about opening the door
for corporate liability. Only two judges of the in banc court (the predictably conservative Moore
and Lumbard) agreed with the district court’s holding requiring a wrongful purpose.26 Moore
argued that the majority’s interpretation “indicates that Congress intended a revolutionary
change in the whole thrust of the securities laws. That is too slim a basis to support a judicial
excursion over such uncharted seas.”27 Moore’s characterization of the majority’s holding

23

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.
25
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.
26
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 869, 881‐889 (Moore, J., dissenting, joined by Lumbard, J.).
27
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 885.
24
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effecting a “revolutionary change” in securities regulation certainly proved prescient, but it
garnered little traction with his fellow judges.
Even the judges who were wary of expanding corporate liability were unwilling to sign
on to the restrictive interpretation of “in connection with.” Friendly, for example, was alarmed
by the specter of corporate liability raised by the majority’s holding.
It is inconceivable that Congress meant that the SEC’s rule‐making power under
§ 10(b) should enable it to impose on press releases and other company
statements not made in the sale of a security a liability broader and
unaccompanied by the procedural safeguards of § 12 of the Securities Act or §
18 of the Exchange Act. Yet the combination of the majority’s broad reading of
‘In connection with’ and its holding that Rule 10‐b‐5 encompasses negligent
misrepresentation produces exactly that result. The consequences would be
most serious. Either innocent stockholders will be damaged, as I have indicated,
or companies will clam up …28
Friendly at “first thought that the way of out of this dilemma was to agree with [Moore’s]
limited reading of ‘in connection with.’”29 But he was dissuaded by issues raised in a case argued
the same week as Texas Gulf Sulphur, Great American,30 as well as Louis Loss’s position on the
issue.31
In his memo in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, Irving Kaufman urged that “The 1934 Act
and the rules adopted pursuant thereto contain broad remedial provisions that should be
liberally construed; I fear that [Moore]’s limited reading would effectively insulate many

28

Memo of HJF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/8/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
29
Memo of HJF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/8/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
30
SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2nd Cir. 1968).
31
Memo of HJF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/8/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library (“If this would be the last case to raise the issue [of “in connection
with”], I would [agree with Moore]. But it won’t be, as witness Great American. True we could distinguish
that cases on that that GAI was constantly issuing stock, but this seems unsatisfactory and Professor Loss,
who objects to an unlimited expansion of Rule 10‐b‐5, thinks the rule may be applied ‘when a company
publishes a prospectus or financial statement with the clear intention of conducting open‐market
purchases.’ P. 1769.”).
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predatory practices from commission purview.”32 A new theme emerges here: judicial support
for limiting private lawsuits, but not if the limitation also constrained the SEC’s authority.33 This
differential private/public treatment would be a recurring issue in the Supreme Court’s
securities jurisprudence in subsequent years.34
Judge Willard Feinberg, like Friendly, viewed the press release as “the most important
issue in the case.” Notwithstanding his concerns over corporate liability, Feinberg’s take on the
“in connection with” issue is typical of his colleagues in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
imposing civil liability on the corporation because of this and no more, as [Henry
Friendly] and [Irving Kaufman] have pointed out, could have disastrous results.
In addition to inhibiting the flow of corporate information, private damage suits
could bankrupt corporations, with the big losers including the very shareholders
the rule is supposed to protect. Therefore, it does seem necessary to limit
potential liability in a conceptually defensible way. However, narrowing the
definition of “in connection with” is not wise. It will insulate intentionally
misleading statements which are intended to affect stock prices; such deception
should be covered by Rule 10b‐5. The remedial intent of Congress can be better
served by continuing to interpret “in connection with” broadly, but limiting the
application of the Rule by other means.35

The “in connection with” requirement offered a textual basis for limiting corporate liability, but
the language chosen by Congress hardly compelled a restrictive reading. More relevant for an
intermediate appellate court, a narrow construction of the language would seem to fly in the

32

Memo of IRK, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/14/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
33
See also Memo of WF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/28/1968), Henry Friendly Collection,
Box 135, Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library (“The justification for making ... a distinction [between
injunctive relief and damages] here is even stronger, where the plaintiff is the Commission representing
the public.”) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963) for the
proposition “that ‘[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the
elements required in a suit for monetary damages.’”).
34
See text at infra notes ‐ .
35
Memo of WF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/28/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library. See also Memo of JJS, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (6/3/1968),
Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135, Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library (Press release “was ‘in
connection with’ purchase and sale of securities because of its intended and inevitable market effect.).

11
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018

11

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 154 [2018]

Genesis of Corporate Liability| Pritchard & Thompson
face of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Capital Gains that “securities legislation enacted for
the purpose of avoiding frauds” was to be construed “not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”36 That instruction from above – issued in a case
reversing a narrow reading of the securities laws by the Second Circuit—lurked in the
background in Texas Gulf Sulphur, as it did in other expansive Second Circuit securities cases in
the 1960s.

B. State of Mind
Friendly pointed the way toward a means other than “in connection with” to limit the
reach of Rule 10b‐5. In Friendly’s memo in the Great American case written just a day after his
Texas Gulf Sulphur memo, he commented “Once we decide that ‘in connection with’ is not a
useful method for bringing some limits on Rule 10‐b‐5 but that the way to do this is to impose
some kind of guilty action requirement, this case is not a hard one.”37 Here Friendly sees what
would become the preferred method to limit 10b‐5 by both the Supreme Court (Ernst & Ernst,
discussed below) and the Congress (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).38
The issue of the requisite state of mind for a violation of Rule 10b‐5 was still very much
in play circa 1968. Neither Rule 10b‐5, nor its underlying statute, § 10(b), explicitly set forth a
required state of mind for violations. The possibilities ranged from strict liability, to negligence,
to recklessness, to knowledge, or specific intent to harm. The common law of fraud rejected
strict liability, perhaps included negligence as a species of equitable fraud, and generally
accepted the last three possibilities in suits for damages. The question of state of mind was

36

Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (citations and quotations omitted).
Memo of HJF, SEC v. Great American Industries (5/9/1968), at 3, Henry Friendly Collection, Box
135, Folder 6, Harvard Law School Library.
38
Pub. L. No. 104‐67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
37
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further complicated by the fact that corporations do not have minds: they are fictional legal
entities. Whose intentions would count?
The majority’s arguments relating to “in connection with” overlap with its arguments
relating to state of mind.39 The Second Circuit strongly sided with the SEC, rejecting the effort to
“handicap unreasonably the Commission in its work.”40 The court cited Capital Gains for the
proposition that “[i]n an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the
common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader
protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.”41
The majority opted for the negligence standard, as “comport[ing] with the administrative and
legislative purposes underlying the Rule” that would “promote[] the deterrence objective of the
Rule.”42 The only concession to concerns about corporate liability was to limit the negligence
holding to injunctive actions brought by the SEC.43 Even there, however, the majority placed the
burden on the defendant to establish its due diligence.44 Private suits for damages would wait
for another day.45

39

Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority’s argument for rejecting wrongful purpose would
require a strict liability standard, an argument that Justice Powell would gently mock the SEC for making
in support of a negligence standard in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976) (“The logic of
this effect‐oriented approach would impose liability for wholly faultless conduct where such conduct
results in harm to investors, a result the Commission would be unlikely to support.”).
40
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 861.
41
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854‐855.
42
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 855.
43
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 863.
44
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 862 (“if corporate management demonstrates that it was
diligent in ascertain that the information it published was the whole truth and that such diligently
obtained information was disseminated in good faith, Rule 10b‐5 would not have been violated.”)
45
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 863 (“The only remedy the Commissions seeks against the
corporation is an injunction and therefore we do not find it necessary to decide whether just a lack of due
diligence on the part of Texas Gulf Sulphur, absent a showing of bad faith, would subject the Corporation
to any liability for damages.”).
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The reservation of that question did not placate Friendly. In his initial memo on the case
he had argued for the fraudulent intent requirement from the common law, invoking the
authority of Jerome Frank, the SEC Chair prior to his appointment to the Second Circuit.
The … more satisfactory[] escape is by holding that § 10(b) is limited to cases
where there is some kind of an evil motive, as said by Judge Frank in Fischman v.
Raytheon Mf. Co. 188 F.2d 783, 786 2 Cir. 1951) – which I take to be required
also under § 17 of the 1933 Act. At the very least § 10‐b doesn’t authorize
imposition for negligent execution in the course of pursuing a good motive.
Certainly this would seem the appropriate view for private suits. One might
argue that as a policy matter, a different view should prevail for injunction suits
by the SEC. However, I see no basis in the statute for making that distinction and
the SEC’s power to stop trading will usually suffice to enable it to bring the
company to terms.46
In his published concurrence, Friendly blurred the difference between scienter for injunctions
and private actions for damages. Repeating his concerns about the frightening consequences for
corporate liability in press release contexts such as this, Friendly somewhat obtusely, left some
room for injunctions on a lower standard: “I am not disposed to hold that Congress meant to
deny a power whose use in appropriate cases can be of such great public benefit and do so little
harm to legitimate activity.” But he paired this broader space for injunctions with a strong
suggestion to the trial judge on remand that an injunction in a case such as this would not be
appropriate.47 Friendly’s initial difficulty in drawing a line between private suits and SEC suits
with respect to state of mind would prove dispositive when the issue eventually reached the
Supreme Court, as we discuss below.48 For the time being, however, all options were available
to the judges of the Second Circuit.

46

Memo of HJF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/8/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
47
401 F.2d at 869 (“Here there is no danger of repetetion…a once in a lifetime affair…I am
content to leave it to [the trial judge] to consider whether although he has the power to issue an
injunction, there is equity in this portion of the bill.”)
48
When the question of state of mind arose under Rule 14a‐9, however, Friendly and the Second
Circuit came down on the side of negligence. Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 475 F.2d 1281 (2nd Cir.
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Other judges shared Friendly’s concern about the negligence standard, but there was no
consensus among them on the correct standard. Irving Kaufman responded to Friendly’s memo:
While I am attracted to HJF’s proposal of limiting §10(b) to cases where there is
some kind of evil motive, or, in Loss’ terms, p. 1766, imposing a watered‐down
scienter requirement, it seems to me that such an explicit formulation goes
against the thrust of S.E.C. v. Capitol [sic] Gains … Also, I see no reason why
§10(b) should not apply to a release issued with the best of motives that was
truly distorted or prepared in a careless or wreckless [sic] manner.49
Capital Gains, which had offered strong support to the majority’s broad insider trading holding,
again loomed, this time as an obstacle to efforts to restrain corporate liability under Rule 10b‐5.
Judge Robert Anderson worried about the ability to courts to manage a disclosure regime so
ambitious: “Aside from the dubious nature of the proposition that §10(b) was intended to cover
the field of corporate reporting, absent some more explicit guidance from Congress, the courts
seem exceedingly ill‐equipped to handle this new general supervisory task.” 50 He favored a
recklessness standard set at a very high level:
A corporation should be held under 10b‐5 for the consequences of a materially
misleading press release only where the corporation‘s behavior in issuing the
release is in some sense fraudulent or so reckless that evil intent would be
presumed. While this would exclude negligence, it would cover reckless
disregard for the accuracy of releases and for their effect on the market as well

1973). Friendly leaned heavily on the textual differences between § 10(b) and § 14(a), emphasizing the
broader rulemaking authority afforded the SEC by the latter. Id. at 1299. Friendly also looked to the
structure of the Exchange Act:
while an open‐ended reading of Rule 10b‐5 would render the express civil liability
provisions of the securities acts largely superfluous, and be inconsistent with the
limitations Congress built into these sections, a reading of Rule 14a‐9 as imposing
liability without scienter in a case like the present is completely compatible with the
statutory scheme.
Id.
49

Memo of IRK, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/14/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
50
Memo of RPA, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/27/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
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as cases of purposeful misrepresentation made in pursuit of an ulterior
motive.51
Kaufman and Anderson eventually coalesced around a concurrence written by Friendly.52 The
suggestion of a fourth member of the court with similar views, Wilfred Feinberg, that “the
opinion should indicate our receptivity to some limiting doctrine in the private suit without
spelling it out now” proved difficult to craft and Feinberg signed on to the majority opinion.53

II.

The Aftermath
Texas Gulf Sulphur laid down a marker in 10b‐5 jurisprudence, but it was hardly the last

word. The “in connection with” element was the first issue from Texas Gulf Sulphur to reach the
Supreme Court, just three years later. In 1971, purpose was still the coin of the realm in
statutory interpretation of the securities laws. Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion for the court
in Bankers Life gave an even broader application to the phrase than Texas Gulf Sulphur had.
Thereafter the requirement receded in securities cases; the cases that did arise on this question,
perhaps because the doctrine had been pushed to the edges of factual connection, led toward
narrowing interpretations by both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit. In contrast,
scienter, which would not reach the Supreme Court until almost a decade later, became the key
element policing the scope of corporate liability under Rule 10b‐5.

A. Bankers Life: Widening the reach of “in connection with”
The facts of Bankers Life, a case that came to the Second Circuit and then to the
Supreme Court in 1971, suggested egregious misconduct by those in control of the corporation.

51

Memo of RPA, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/27/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
52
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 864‐868 (Friendly, J., concurring, joined in part by Kaufman and
Anderson).
53
Memo of WF, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (5/28/1968), Henry Friendly Collection, Box 135,
Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library.
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Moreover, there were clearly substantial losses to the shareholders. The connection between
the securities transaction and the misconduct, however, was attenuated. The proceeds from an
insurance company’s sale of securities (bonds) in a market transaction at a fair price were then
shuffled around by insiders with doubtful motives. The end result was that those proceeds were
used to pay for the controlling shares. That is to say, the corporation’s assets had been removed
from the corporate treasury to pay the purchase price for the control block with no offsetting
payment to the corporation. The panel decision, written by District Judge M. Joseph Blumenfeld
sitting by designation and joined by Lumbard, found no Rule 10b‐5 cause of action. 54 The
connection between the wrongdoing and the securities transaction was too remote. The facts
looked like looting, not manipulation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The decision, written for the Court by William O.
Douglas, was handed down within three weeks of argument.55 The opinion was vintage Douglas,
relying strongly on the purpose of the securities laws. The fraud smacked of mismanagement, as
it was perpetrated by officers of the insurance company and their outside collaborators. Douglas
found that fact “irrelevant” given the loss inflicted on the company as a result of the wrongful
conduct.56 Also of no moment was the absence of fraud in the securities transaction itself. All
that was necessary was that the injury to the company was “a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities.”57 The driving force behind the capacious “touching” standard was
Douglas’s extremely broad view of congressional purpose: “’disregard of trust relationships by

54

430 F.2d 355 (2nd Cir. 1971).
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
56
Id. at 10.
57
Id. at 12‐13.
55
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those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries are all a single seamless web’ along with
manipulation, investor ignorance, and the like.”58
Bankers Life was the last hurrah of broad securities interpretations before the arrival of
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist at the turn of the year. Douglas’s reasoning comes straight
out of Capital Gains: “Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”
Douglas does not, however, cite Capital Gains for that rule of interpretation.59 Nor did he cite
the Second Circuit’s classic case, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, 60 limiting the reach of Rule 10b‐5
as applied to corporate mismanagement. Douglas did, however, cherry‐pick Birnbaum’s holding,
embracing its requirement that there be a purchase or sale of a security in a suit by a private
plaintiff.61 (In this case the requisite transaction was the sale of bonds by the corporation.)
The effects of Douglas’s virtual evisceration of the “in connection with” requirement
would surface a generation later in cases which the language might have been a natural tool to
confine corporate liability. In Stoneridge, for example, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that a
massive accounting fraud by a television cable company (Charter) inflated the company’s
reported operating revenues and cash flow.62 The twist was that plaintiffs also named as
defendants two equipment suppliers to Charter, Scientific‐Atlanta and Motorola. The plaintiffs
alleged that Charter paid the suppliers $20 extra for each cable set‐top box in return for the
supplier’s agreement to make additional payments back to Charter in the form of advertising
fees. The suppliers had no direct role in preparing or disseminating the fraudulent accounting
information, nor did they approve Charter’s financial statements.63 Justice Anthony Kennedy,

58

404 U.S. at 11.
404 U.S. at 12.
60
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1952).
61
Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9.
62
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific‐Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
63
552 U.S. at 159.
59
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writing for the Court, focused on the lack of reliance: Investors relied on Charter for its financial
statements, not the cable set‐top box transactions underlying those financial statements. But
Kennedy’s principal concern was the specter of the seemingly unlimited reach of 10b‐5 liability.
Kennedy argued that the plaintiff’s theory threatened to inject the § 10(b) cause of action into
“the realm of ordinary business operations.”64 According to Kennedy, “[w]ere this concept of
reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which
the issuing company does business.”65 Kennedy pointed to § 10(b)’s limit that the deceptive act
must “be in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” And the limits that he was
drawing around the concept of reliance could have more naturally been put into the “in
connection with” element.
Why not use the “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” language to
limit the scope of the Rule 10b‐5 cause of action? Reminiscent of the attitude articulated by
Judge Kaufman in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the use of the “in connection with the purchase or sale”
requirement would limit not only private plaintiffs, but potentially, the SEC, whose enforcement
authority is limited by the reach of the statute. Kennedy acknowledged that the SEC’s
enforcement authority might reach commercial transactions like those between Charter and its
suppliers, but he was reluctant to afford the same freedom to the plaintiffs’ bar.66 Given the
need to cabin private rights of action, but maintain the SEC’s discretion, the reliance
requirement was a flexible tool. Reliance does not apply in enforcement actions brought by the

64

552 U.S. at 161.
552 U.S. at 160.
66
552 U.S. at 161 (“Were the implied cause of action to be extended to the practices described
here … there would be a risk that the federal power would be used to invite litigation beyond the
immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already governed by functioning and effective state‐
law guarantees.”).
65
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SEC, or criminal prosecutions brought by the Justice Department.67 Putting the limit on
secondary party liability in the reliance element rather than “in connection with” allowed the
Court to have its cake – unfettered government enforcement – and eat it, too – constrain the
scope of private actions. Stoneridge shows that “In connection with” does no work in the
Supreme Court‘s Rule 10b‐5 jurisprudence. The Court’s only contribution has been to reverse
lower courts attempting to give the “in connection with” requirement some teeth.68
Fifteen years after Texas Gulf Sulphur and toward the end of his career, Friendly took
another shot at “in connection with.” Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson69 raised the issue of
whether a pledge of stock was “in connection with the purchase or sale.” Six weeks after
argument that had produced an initial unanimous vote of the appellate panel to affirm the
district court’s holding that it was “in connection with,” Friendly concluded that a pledge of
stock was not a purchase or sale, maintaining the viability of the limits established in Birnbaum.
Friendly persuaded one of his panel members, so his view became a majority. His opinion for
the Second Circuit has been cited hundreds of times, not often finding “in connection with,” but
providing a way to explain this doctrine that others have found attractive.70

B. State of Mind
When the issue of state of mind in a private lawsuit eventually arrived at the Second
Circuit five years after Texas Gulf Sulphur, a majority of the en banc Second Circuit (including
Friendly) held “that proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is necessary to establish

67

Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The SEC is not required to prove reliance
or injury in enforcement cases.”); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1998) (government need
not prove reliance in criminal case).
68
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
69
726 F.2d 930 (1983)
70
Westlaw search of citing references for “720 F.2d 930” (March 13, 2018).
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liability under Rule 10b‐5 for a private cause of action,”71 distinguishing the holding in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that had accepted a negligence standard for an injunction action.72 When the state of
mind question reached the Supreme Court three years later in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,73 the
SEC supported the plaintiff in seeking a negligence standard under § 10(b). Powell’s opinion for
the Court rebuffed the SEC holding that negligence could not satisfy the necessary state of mind
in a private cause of action.74 Powell relied heavily on a textual exegesis of § 10(b) in his
opinion;75 purpose received short shrift. The SEC’s only consolation in Ernst & Ernst was that
Powell was forced, in order to hold his majority, to reserve the question of whether the scienter
standard would apply to an action for injunctive relief brought by the SEC.76 Powell’s conference
notes from Ernst & Ernst record Justice Stewart’s view that an injunctive suit by the SEC might
present a different case,77 but Powell’s heavy reliance on the language of § 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst
undermined that position when the issue came up in a subsequent term. Section 10(b) makes
no distinction between government and private litigants, hardly a surprise given that Congress
did not anticipate private litigation under § 10(b) when it adopted the Exchange Act in 1934.

71

Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 ( 2nd Cir. 1973).
Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1305. Four judges would have permitted imposition of liability on a director
for the corporation’s misleading statements where the director failed to make any inquiry Lanza, 479 F.2d
at 1311 (Hays, J., dissenting in part, joined by Smith, Oakes, and Timbers). The misstatements occurred in
an exchange of stock with the BarChris Construction Co. in a transaction at the same time as the famous
§11 liability case under the Securities Act of 1933. The dissent would have held the outside director liable
under Rule 10b‐5 for conduct similar to the behavior giving rise for liability under § 11 of the 1933 Act.
73
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
74
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
75
425 U.S. at 197‐201.
76
Telephone Interview by Pritchard with Greg Palm (former Powell clerk) (June 6, 2002); see
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The decision in Ernst & Ernst was 6‐2 with
Justices Blackmun and Brennan dissenting and Justice Stevens not participating. If Powell lost Stewart and
one more from Marshall, White, Burger and Rehnquist, the court would have split 4‐4. At conference,
Marshall suggested that he would be opposed to depriving the SEC of the negligence standard.
Handwritten notes of Harry Blackmun from the Conference on Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, (Dec. 5, 1975),
at 2, Harry Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress.
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Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, (Dec. 5, 1975), at 1.
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Nonetheless, “policy concerns” raised by private litigation played an important role in Ernst &
Ernst, as they had in Texas Gulf Sulphur, this time leading to a more restrictive result.
Even with that necessary reservation, Powell did not go as far as he might have in laying
out the requirements of Rule 10b‐5. On the question of the required state of mind, Powell,
objected to his clerk’s distinction between “‘knowing or intentional misconduct’, on the one
hand, and negligence or ‘negligent misfeasance’, on the other.”78 Powell preferred the middle
ground established by Judge Arlin Adams in a concurrence to a Third Circuit opinion:
Judge Adams in Korn [sic] (at p. 287) used language that I like:
“An intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”
Adams, p. 285, also referred to Judge Friendly’s formulation as including
“recklessness” that amounts to fraud. What would you think of our using the
term “scienter” and defining it early in the opinion, using the Adams/Friendly
terminology?79
Friendly’s influence was still being felt; this discussion suggests that Powell agreed with Friendly
that recklessness would satisfy the scienter requirement.80 The first part of this suggestion was
adopted, with the eventual opinion defining scienter as “a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”81 The final opinion, however, did not incorporate
recklessness, specifically reserving the question.82 Powell, despite his desire to offer guidance to
the bar, had a general preference for not addressing questions unnecessary to the decision.

78

Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Greg Palm, at 2 (Feb. 4, 1976).
Id. (citing Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J., concurring)).
80
Powell sent a copy of Ernst & Ernst to Friendly, telling Judge Friendly that his “opinions and
writing contributed significantly to our resolution of . . . [the] case[].” Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., to Judge Henry J. Friendly 1 (Apr. 6, 1976). Judge Friendly responded that he “was delighted both at
the result and at your skillful handling of the problems.” Letter from Judge Henry J. Friendly to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Apr. 9, 1976).
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Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
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Accordingly, he left resolution of this issue to a subsequent case.83 Powell could have settled the
law in Ernst & Ernst, but held back.
The Supreme Court continued to avoided the question of whether recklessness satisfies
§ 10(b) even as each of the circuits offered different verbal formula. There were variations in
these formulas, but they were all likely in a narrower range than decisions in the 1960s and 70s.
Congress has been no better at resolving the question. The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 contains a section entitled state of mind but eschews any description other than to
say that the required state of mind (whatever it might be) must be pled with particularity.84
Powell can be forgiven for failing to anticipate that the Court would not resolve the issue; the
Court’s appetite for securities law cases would wane after he left the Court. Congress’s failure to
resolve the question is harder to justify.85
Four years after Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court closed the door on the SEC’s attempt
to gain injunctive relief on the basis of negligence.86 In SEC v. Aaron, the Second Circuit (in an
opinion written by Judge Timbers, former general counsel of the SEC) read Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder narrowly in order to hold that the SEC only needed to show negligence when seeking
an injunction.87 Friendly, who was not on the panel, expressed skepticism that Hochfelder could
be limited in responding to a letter Timbers wrote him about the upcoming opinion: “An
injunction cannot be issued unless there has been a violation, and if negligent misrepresentation
is not a violation that would support a judgment for damages, how can it be a violation at all? …
I think the best way to mitigate the damage is to do what I did in Lipper and Commonwealth,
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15 U.S.C. 78u‐4(b)(2).
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namely, to read Hochfelder as applying only to negligent misrepresentation.”88 Powell worried
about the SEC as well as private litigants: “[A] suit [by the SEC] [and] an injunction are punitive
[and] can impose severe stigma [and] other penalties.”89 Friendly’s concern in Texas Gulf Sulphur
that§ 10(b) would not easily support a distinction for the required state of mind between
private actors (recklessness) and government actors (negligence) turned out to be prescient.
Aaron raised another issue that was not present in Ernst & Ernst: the state of mind
required for liability under § 17(a) of the Securities Act, which prohibited “any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.”90 The Court previously had found–in Capital Gains—that similar language in the
Investment Advisers Act did not require the SEC to establish an intent to deceive.91 Powell
discussed the case with Justice Stewart before the conference and they agreed upon a
resolution. Powell apparently came round to Justice Stewart’s view that § 17(a) could not be
interpreted in the same fashion as § 10(b).92 Text prevailed over policy. Justice Stewart wrote
the opinion for the Court, leaning “heavily + properly on Ernst & Ernst.”93

88

Note HJF to Judge Timbers, SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc. (3/22/1978), Henry
Friendly Collection, Box 89, Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library. Here Friendly expressed agreement with
Blackmun in Hochfelder who had preferred the same standard for injunctions and private damages, but
then opted for the lower standard for each as opposed to the higher standard for each that the Court
majority got to after Aaron.
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Bench Memorandum, Aaron v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Feb. 15, 1980) (emphasis
added by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
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Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687 (1980) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)).
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Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (construing section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, Pub. L.
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Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Aaron v. SEC (Feb. 27,
1980), at 1. Powell notes on his copy of Justice Stewart’s eventual draft that Justice Stewart “reads §
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Justice Potter Stewart, First Draft Opinion, Aaron v. SEC, supra note 87, at 1 (handwritten notes
of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Justice Stewart again reserved the question of whether the definition of
scienter included reckless behavior. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5.
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For the SEC, Aaron was a victory, despite the Court’s rejection of its argument for a
negligence standard under § 10(b). Statutory language and precedent preserved the
enforcement tool of §17(a), despite the misgivings of at least Powell and Stewart about the
SEC’s use of injunctions. The threat perceived by Powell was confined; Stewart took care to note
that the Court did not address whether a private cause of action exists under § 17(a).94

Conclusion
Texas Gulf Sulphur, a critical case in the development of insider trading, had an equally
significant impact on the development of corporate liability under Rule 10b‐5 for misstatements
by corporate officers even in the absence of trading by either the corporation or its officers. This
aspect of the opinion is interpretive twin of the insider trading holding—the emphasis is on the
broad purposive approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Capital Gains and J.I. Case v.
Borak. Texas Gulf Sulphur is truly a product of the jurisprudence of the 1960s.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s decision on corporate liability differs from its
insider trading holding in that it also contained the seeds of limits, particularly scienter, that
would be adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1970s. The Supreme Court broadened the “in
connection with” requirement in Bankers Life. State of mind, however, took a different path.
Powell insisted on a scienter requirement for private causes of action, influenced by the views of
Henry Friendly. Unlike the Second Circuit, however, Powell ultimately persuaded his colleagues
to adopt the scienter standard in SEC enforcement actions as well. Nonetheless, the framework
for corporate liability established by Texas Gulf Sulphur, despite having been pruned back a bit
by the Supreme Court and Congress, is still reflected in the litigation weapon against
corporations that Rule 10b‐5 is today.

94

Id. at 689.
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